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Discussants' Response No. 1 to
"Illegal Acts: What is The Auditor's Responsibility?"
Editor's Note: As mentioned in the preface, we have two discussants'
responses for this paper. Thefirst response represents the comments
by three students from the accounting program at the University of
Kansas. These students were selected as the 1990 Deloitte & Touche
Symposium Fellows. The other response is the usual academician's
remarks by Professor McNair, Mississippi State University. The two
responses are given below in the order they were presented.

Tim Damewood
Susan Harshberger
Russ Jones
University of Kansas
Our objective in critiquing the paper by Mr. Guy, Mr. Whittington and
Mr. Neebes is tofind ways of improving SAS 54 [AICPA, 1988]. Our comments will deal with issues related not only to reducing ambiguities in the
interpretation and implementation of the SAS by different auditingfirms but
also with expanding the scope of SAS 54 to other issues that have not been
considered by the profession. Our discussion will be directed towards SAS
54 because much of the paper is a restatement of the SAS.
We will address the following issues in our paper:
•
•
•
•
•
•

The distinction between direct and indirect illegal acts.
The auditor's competence in detecting illegal acts.
SAS 54's "if necessary" clause.
Auditor's neutrality towards industry in detecting illegal acts.
Qualitative materiality.
Auditor's responsibility towards communicating audit findings.

Thefirst issue is direct versus indirect illegal acts. In order to accomplish
the objective of consistent application of the SAS, there needs to be a more
clear distinction between direct and indirect illegal acts within the SAS. In
the case of direct effect illegal acts, the auditor is responsible for designing
the audit to provide reasonable assurance that thefinancial statement amounts
are free from material misstatement resultingfrom such acts. However, in
the case of indirect effect illegal acts, the auditor is responsible for the detection of such acts only when information comes to his or her attention concerning their possible existence.Thelast sentence of paragraph seven of SAS
54 more clearly states the auditor's responsibilities for indirect illegal acts:
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"... an audit made in accordance with GAAS provides no assurance that illegal acts will be detected or that any contingent liabilities that may result
will be disclosed." Given this wide disparity in the treatment between direct
and indirect illegal acts, it is crucial that the auditor is provided with a clearer
distinction between these two types of illegal acts. What if the auditor did not
detect any illegal acts and therefore, according to SAS 54, assumed that any
illegal acts that actually existed were indirect in nature and not within the auditor's responsibilities? Then, in retrospect, assume that a direct effect illegal act did occur. Since the auditor did not detect nor disclose this act, he or
she would be liable to the users of thefinancial statements.
It is clear that the difference in responsibility for direct and indirect illegal acts is critical in determining the auditor's liability. The paper and SAS
54 define direct and indirect illegal acts primarily by example. We contend
that their use of only one example to describe indirect illegal acts, which is
simplistic compared to the complexities that can and do arise in reality, is insufficient in leading auditors to consistent application of the standard. The
example used in the paper is the same one that was used in SAS 54. To illustrate these complexities consider the following situation. A chemical manufacturer is operating at a gross margin of ten percent while other companies
in the industry are operating at an average of five percent. Suppose that this
higher gross margin is due to the fact that the company has failed to acquire
the requisite environmental protection equipment. One could argue that the
difference in the gross margin has a direct effect on thefinancial statements,
while another could argue that the effect of the illegal act is indirect due to
fines or other contingent liabilities that might arise due to the company's failure to follow the requirements of the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA).
A second important issue relates to the auditor's competence in detecting illegal acts. As the authors state in the paper, SAS 54 professes that auditors do not possess the legal training necessary to recognize all circumstances
leading to litigation. Also, the SAS contends that the determination as to whether
or not a particular act is illegal is generally based on the advice of an informed
expert qualified to practice law. Given the auditor's lack of legal expertise,
SAS 54 directs the auditor towards management in the search for illegal
acts. Further, the paper states that audit procedures rely heavily upon the
cooperation of the client's management. However, this heavy reliance on the
client's management provides only limited evidence of compliance with laws
and regulations. And, while this limitation is discussed in the paper, no alternative audit procedures are provided. We believe that the paper should
highlight procedures outside of receiving management representations, such
as examining regulatory approval letters or political contributions.
The third issue we wish to discuss deals with the "if necessary" words
that appear in paragraph twelve of SAS 54. We believe that SAS 54 is contradicting itself with this paragraph. Itfirst disclaims the auditor's competence
in the area of illegal acts, and then directs the auditor towards management
for information concerning any such acts. But in paragraph 12, the auditor's
responsibilities are increased by the "if necessary" language. This clause takes
the responsibility off of the client, where it rightfully belongs, and instead al158

lows the client to force the auditor to decide the legality of the client's acts.
The client should be the one who makes any decisions and arrives at any conclusions necessary in regards to alleged illegal acts. The auditor should only
be required to act upon the decisions of management. It is our belief that the
"if necessary" clause should be removedfrom the SAS 54 and that auditors
should be required to consult with a legal counsel when any and all illegal
acts are discovered.
We are also concerned about one of the paper's recommendations. The
authors argue that the auditor's detection responsibility for illegal acts cannot be expanded because the auditor is not an expert in the area. This is quite
true, but auditors are often forced to use outside experts in the conduct of
an audit when they lack the necessary expertise. In fact, SAS No. 11, Using
the work of a specialist [AICPA, 1975, and 1989], addresses this subject.
So why not require the use of lawyers as outside experts during an audit?
We are not suggesting that lawyers work alongside auditors throughout the
audit or be used on every audit. Instead, a lawyer could be required if the auditor is not satisfied after inquiry of management counsel (the "if necessary"
point). At the very least, a reference should be made to SAS No. 11.
A fourth issue deserving of comment on deals with auditor's neutrality
towards industry in detecting illegal acts. Seeing no discussion of this issue
in the paper and SAS No. 54 implies that the auditor should maintain a neutral attitude across industries. It is our contention that auditors should have
greater skepticism before beginning audits in certain industries where illegal acts may be prevalent. The defense, savings and loan, and securities industries are prime examples.
Ourfifth concern about SAS No. 54 deals with the definition of qualitative materiality. This issue was not addressed in the paper. SAS No. 54 requires the auditor to evaluate both the quantitative and qualitative materiality
of an illegal act that comes to his or her attention. Qualitative materiality is
defined by example with a reference to SAS No. 47 [AICPA, 1983]: "an illegal payment of an otherwise immaterial amount could be material if there is
a reasonable possibility that it could lead to a material contingent liability or
a material loss of revenue." We believe that such a definition is inadequate.
An illegal act could be "qualitatively material" even if its quantitative effect on thefinancial statements is not material now or even several periods
later. The term "qualitatively material" suggests an illegal act that, if committed
by top management or with the knowledge of top management, would affect
the decision of a reasonable user of thefinancial statements. Examples of such
illegal acts are: violations of securities laws, environmental laws, and bidding
regulations for government contracts. By not adequately defining the term,
SAS 54 may be allowing auditors not to require management disclosure of
illegal acts which users would be genuinely concerned about. Illegal acts of
this nature directly reflect the integrity of management.
Investors do actually care about more than merely the quantitative aspects
of companies they invest in. The presence of "clean" mutual funds, which do
not invest in companies with major ties to South Africa or companies with
operations which harm the environment, is one indicator that investors are
concerned about the qualitative aspects of companies they invest in.
159

We believe that qualitative materiality could be better defined. Of course,
it is very difficult to define such an ideal standard which could be applied consistently across audits and among auditors. Any new definition would, of course,
require future research. But a good definition of qualitative materiality as it
applies to illegal acts might include the following points:
• The illegal act is a felony.
• A member of top management has been convicted of or charged with,
or a member of top management knew of and could have prevented
the act.
• Purely personal acts unrelated to thefinancial statements should be
excluded.
In regards to our last issue that deals with auditor's responsibility towards
communicating auditfindings, the authors state:
One of the objectives of the expectation gap SAS's was to improve
the communications to boards of directors and audit committees to help
them fulfill theirfinancial reporting and oversight responsibilities.
While we feel that SAS 54 does an adequate job improving communications between auditors and their clients, it falls short in the task of closing the
expectation gap that exists between the public and the auditor in regards to
the detection of illegal acts. Many people in the public incorrectly view an auditor as an expert on every matter relating to a client'sfinancial statements.
However, according to paragraph three of SAS 54, an auditor is "one who is
proficient in accounting and auditing," not in the detection of illegal acts.
One way to close this expectation gap would be to modify the standard
unqualified audit report to include an additional paragraph that deals with the
client's system of internal control. Currently, the AICPA has formed a task
force to examine this possibility. An internal control paragraph would serve
two purposes. First, it would clearly communicate to users that management
is responsible for establishing a system of internal control. The paragraph might
also include the following items that the client's system is supposed to accomplish:
•
•
•
•
•
•

Provide reliable data,
Safeguard assets,
Promote operational efficiency,
Encourage adherence to proscribed management policies,
Comply with the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act,
Prevent and detect illegal acts.

In addition, the paragraph should state that management is responsible
for the design, installation, and effectiveness of the company's internal control
system as discussed in SAS 30. Also, the additional paragraph should include
the auditor's opinion about how the client's internal control system is meeting the above objectives. According to the second standard of field work, the
auditor is only required to obtain an "understanding" of the client's internal
control system. In order for an auditor to express an opinion on the quality
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of a client's internal control, more audit procedures may be required. The
AICPA and auditing firms would be required to determine the appropriate
amount of procedures that are necessary in order to issue an opinion. SAS
63 [AICPA, 1988] on auditing of governmental entities may be useful in designing any standard on the internal control reporting requirements for publicly traded firms. Auditors are required to report on the quality of a
governmental entity's internal control structure.
While we believe that the modification of the standard audit report to include an opinion on the client's internal control would help close the expectation gap, it may not be necessary for all types of clients. For example, for a
small, sole proprietorship with a small number of financial users the additional
cost of evaluating their internal control system would probably be impractical. The additional procedures and fourth paragraph would be most appropriate for publicly traded companies with a large number of financial users.
In conclusion, a conversation that we had with Tom Bintinger, a partner
with Deloitte & Touche and a member of the Auditing Standards Board at
the time SAS 54 was adopted, summed up our reasons for suggesting a
change in the standard audit report. He said that it would be far more constructive to establish preventive measures than to increase the auditor's detection responsibilities. After all, it would be better to stop illegal acts before
they occur rather than simply discovering them after-the-fact.
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